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The proliferation of aid projects may overburden recipient governments with 
reporting requirements, donor visits, and other administrative overhead, siphoning 
off scarce domestic recipient resources, such as tax revenue or the time of skilled 
government officials, from directly productive use. But greater oversight may also 
improve the administration of projects, increasing development. I present a model of 
aid projects that reflects both sides of this coin. It posits a distinction between 
national-level governance and project-level governance. A donor can raise project-
level governance above the baseline national level by requiring oversight activities 
of the recipient, although the benefits from doing so are less where national-level 
governance is already high. The model assumes that larger projects demand 
proportionally less oversight activity from the recipient. Comparative statics analysis 
suggests that to maximize development, projects should be larger where aid volume 
is higher, to avoid overburdening recipient administrative capacity; where recipient 
resources are scarcer, for the same reason; and where national governance is good, 
since the marginal benefit of oversight is then lower. A multi-donor generalization 
shows how donors that are imperfectly altruistic, caring most about the success of 
their own projects, will tend to sink into competitive proliferation, in which each 
donor subdivides its aid budget into smaller projects to raise the marginal 
productivity of the recipient’s resources in those projects and attract them away from 
other donors. The inefficiency arises from the lack of a market among donors for 
recipient resources. In a Nash equilibrium, competitive proliferation reduces overall 
development. But the smallest (selfish) donors can gain. This would discourage them 
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Abstract: The proliferation of aid projects may overburden recipient governments with reporting 
requirements, donor visits, and other administrative overhead, siphoning off scarce domestic recipient 
resources, such as tax revenue or the time of skilled government officials, from directly productive use. 
But greater oversight may also improve the administration of projects, increasing development. I present a 
model of aid projects that reflects both sides of this coin. It posits a distinction between national-level 
governance and project-level governance. A donor can raise project-level governance above the baseline 
national level by requiring oversight activities of the recipient, although the benefits from doing so are 
less where national-level governance is already high. The model assumes that larger projects demand 
proportionally less oversight activity from the recipient. Comparative statics analysis suggests that to 
maximize development, projects should be larger where aid volume is higher, to avoid overburdening 
recipient administrative capacity; where recipient resources are scarcer, for the same reason; and where 
national governance is good, since the marginal benefit of oversight is then lower. A multi-donor 
generalization shows how donors that are imperfectly altruistic, caring most about the success of their 
own projects, will tend to sink into competitive proliferation, in which each donor subdivides its aid 
budget into smaller projects to raise the marginal productivity of the recipient’s resources in those 
projects and attract them away from other donors. The inefficiency arises from the lack of a market 
among donors for recipient resources. In a Nash equilibrium, competitive proliferation reduces overall 
development. But the smallest (selfish) donors can gain. This would discourage them from cooperating 
with other donors to contain competitive proliferation. 
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Introduction 
The proliferation of projects is cited as one way in which the foreign aid delivery system is 
running amok (Morss 1984; van de Walle and Johnston 1996; Birdsall 2005). In her catalog of 
the “seven deadly sins” of aid delivery, Birdsall (2005) cites proliferation under “envy,” a 
heading that refers to the failure of donors to coordinate. Evidently, each donor wants its own 
school-building project, its own HIV prevention campaign, and so on. 
In the old days, our elders tell us, higher moral standards prevailed in the donor 
community. According to Morss (1984), during the first two decades of foreign aid to developing 
countries, the 1950s and 1960s, most aid was given in the form of “program support.” By this he 
meant funding for large infrastructure projects or broad support for a sector such as agriculture or 
health, support that could include grants, loans, technical assistance, and commodities. However, 
in the 1970s, doubts about the effectiveness of aid, compounded by demands from legislatures 
for clear results, led to a shift toward project aid. Aid was committed and disbursed in smaller 
packets and goals were more limited and measurable—say, the building of a certain number of 
schools. More than 20 years ago, Morss wrote that: 
the proliferation of donor projects…is having a negative impact on the major government 
institutions of developing nations. Instead of working to establish comprehensive and consistent 
national development objectives and policies, government officials are forced to focus on 
pleasing donors by approving projects that mirror the current development “enthusiasm” of each 
donor. Further, efforts to implement the large number of discrete, donor-financed projects, each 
with its own specific objectives and reporting requirements, use up far more time and effort than 
is appropriate. Project consolidation is needed, but this is unlikely to occur on a significant scale 
because of the competitive nature of donor interactions. 
Today, it is frequently claimed that Tanzania has to file 2,400 reports to donors every year and 
host 1,000 donor visits. Those particular numbers appear to be an urban legend started by a 
speechwriter for World Bank President James Wolfensohn, based on a misreading of van de Roodman, Competitive Proliferation of Aid Projects: A Model CGD Working Paper 89  2 
Walle and Johnston (1996).
2 But in the case of this urban legend, numbers everyone wants to believe 
are in fact reasonable, probably even conservative. Roodman (2006) counts more than 1,500 
individual aid activity commitments to Tanzania during 2001–03—and that only puts the country 
in eighth place, behind Mozambique (with the most commitments), India, China, Russia, 
Ethiopia, Indonesia, and Vietnam. It is natural to wonder whether Ethiopia can efficiently 
oversee as many aid projects as Indonesia. 
Roodman (2006) develops a microeconomic model of aid projects that focuses on the 
costs of proliferation. In that paper, all projects have the same technology, and take two inputs—
aid, and a recipient-side resource such as recurring expenditures or time of skilled officials. The 
total aid flow into a country and the distribution of that flow among projects of various sizes is 
taken as given. A notion of sunk cost is introduced, to represent the reports to be filed, the 
meetings to be attended, and the missions to be hosted, all of which divert recipient resources 
from direct use in aid-financed projects. Analysis shows that if the recipient is not a perfect 
development optimizer, but also cares about project “throughput” (which could be career 
benefits or kickbacks from association with operating projects) then under some circumstances 
increasing aid reduces development. In simulations, a threshold aid level appears beyond which 
the marginal benefit of an aid increase, given the proliferation that tends to come accompany it, 
is low or negative. 
This paper starts by changing that model in one important way: the “sunk costs” of 
project oversight activities now come with a benefit. Oversight and accountability improve the 
quality of implementation of projects, or “project-level governance.” The marginal benefit, 
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however, declines in countries that are generally well-governed anyway. And the marginal cost 
rises where recipient administrative capacity is scarce. These trade-offs give rise to a notion of 
optimal project size at the recipient level. And it becomes possible to define optimal behavior on 
the part of the donor. In particular, it will be shown that projects should be larger in countries 
that a) are better governed, b) have less administrative capacity in absolute terms, or c) receive 
more aid—all else equal. 
The paper then generalizes to multiple donors, showing how aid effectiveness can fall below 
the optimum because of proliferation of small projects. As in the pioneering work of Knack and 
Rahman (2004), the inefficiency occurs if donors are not perfectly altruistic, that is, if they care 
more about the success of their own projects than that of other donors’ projects. “Competitive 
proliferation” then occurs, in which donors divide their aid budgets more finely in order to raise 
the marginal productivity of the recipient government’s resources in those projects and divert the 
resources away from other donors’ projects. Since individual donors do not pay at the margin for 
the recipient inputs into the production processes they design, they experience the benefits of 
diversion but not the costs. Selfish donors thus generate a negative externality, which leads to a 
suboptimal equilibrium. Put otherwise, the development optimum—the set of projects from all 
donors that maximizes total development—is unstable. Theoretical analysis and simulations 
show that the smallest donors have the greatest incentive to proliferate and can even benefit from 
all-out competitive proliferation, even as larger donors and the recipient lose out. Donors could 
coordinate to prevent this outcome, but it would be difficult since the smallest donors would 
somehow need to be bought off.  
A microeconomic model of aid projects 
Knack and Rahman (2004) appear to be the first to devise a model relating to proliferation and 
test it empirically. The key moving part in their model is the skilled national, who can work Roodman, Competitive Proliferation of Aid Projects: A Model CGD Working Paper 89  4 
either for a donor on a specific project, or, at lower pay, for the government, where he or she 
provides a public good that benefits all projects. Donors that hire nationals away from the 
government thus impose an externality on all other projects. The smaller a donor’s share in a 
recipient’s total aid flow, the more of the externality is imposed on other donors. Unless a donor 
is perfectly altruistic, the smaller it is, the greater its tendency to deviate from the optimum by 
proliferating projects and hiring skilled nationals away from the government. The empirical 
prediction is that countries receiving aid flows more fragmented among donors, as measured by a 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index, will have lower bureaucratic quality in government. Knack and 
Rahman find that the data uphold the prediction. 
The model described here is similar in spirit to that of Knack and Rahman while 
departing from it in important ways. In particular, it generates norms or predictions about how 
donors size projects. The aid process is a set of production activities (projects), with identical 
technologies. A project, indexed by i, has two inputs: aid, Ai, and a recipient-side resource, Ri. I 
will refer to Ai as the project’s “size.” The recipient resource can be thought of as the time of 
skilled government bureaucrats, as in Knack and Rahman, or funds for recurring costs, for 
example. The resource is subject to a fixed national-level budget constraint. Each project has a 
monitoring cost that the recipient must cover out of that general budget in order for the project to 
go forward. The monitoring cost is assumed to rise slower than project size, with constant 
elasticity: 
() ( )
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The coefficient s1 is not unitless; rather, it converts between the units for Ai, presumably aid 
dollars, and those of Ri, which could be dollars or local currency or number of people. Having 
noted this subtlety, I will henceforth assume that units are such that s1 = 1, and drop it. Roodman, Competitive Proliferation of Aid Projects: A Model CGD Working Paper 89  5 
The “development” produced by a project, Di, is the product of two non-negative factors. The 
first, called “output” or Oi, can be thought of as the result of a mechanical process, described by 
a standard production function, that combines the donor’s aid and the recipient’s resource input, 
the latter being net of what the recipient must spend on monitoring activities. The second factor 
in development is project-level governance, Gi, which is a function of the recipient’s general 
level of governance, G, and the “monitoring cost ratio,” the ratio of monitoring cost to project 
size. Gi is positive except in the theoretical limit where national-level governance, G, is 0 and 
there is no monitoring. The idea is that the recipient’s overall governance quality is a major 
determinant of project success, but by requiring enough monitoring and oversight, the donor can 
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This governance factor is the major innovation over Roodman (2006). By associating benefits as 
well as costs with the monitoring effort of reports and meetings, analysis of project proliferation 
becomes a matter not just of pure cost, but trade-offs. 
Implicit in this construct is a signaling or principal-agent problem between donor and recipient. 
The donor cannot observe, with perfection and without cost, the recipient’s participation in and 
management of projects. It therefore makes its aid disbursement conditional on the recipient 
performing certain easily observed project-monitoring activities and on satisfactory evaluation 
results flowing from those activities. This creates an incentive for the recipient to participate in a 
way that raises project efficiency, but of course comes at a cost in recipient resources. Roodman, Competitive Proliferation of Aid Projects: A Model CGD Working Paper 89  6 
This leads to a paradox. We will assume throughout for the sake of tractability that the 
recipient is a development maximizer. Why then need the donor monitor at all? The way out of 
the paradox is to imagine a central authority on the recipient side, perhaps a ministry of finance, 
that can allocate resources among projects but has incomplete control over the quality of 
management, technical skill level, corruption, and other factors within the line ministries that use 
the resources. The allocator has the propensity to perfectly maximize development within the 
ambit of its powers, while the line ministries generally do not. Like all such assumptions, this 
one is simplistic but makes for a tractable model that focuses on dynamics of interest. 
Total development from a set of N projects is 
. ∑ =
i
i D D   (3)
In other words, we assume that projects do not interact at either the microeconomic level. Nor do 
they at the macroeconomic level, as they might in a general equilibrium framework; in other 
words, they are implicitly assumed to represent a modest share of GDP. 
We also assume that o is homogeneous of degree d, so that it has declining, constant, or increasing returns 
to scale according to whether d is less than, equal to, or greater than 1. Since a project will only go 
forward if the recipient invests enough in a project to more than cover the monitoring cost, 
( ) () ( ) . 0   if   0 , < − = − i i i i i A s R A s R A o   (4)
This condition can make o discontinuous at the point where monitoring costs are just covered. 
For example, if  () ()( ), , i i i i i i A s R A A s R A o − + = −  output will equal 0 if the recipient falls a 
penny short of covering monitoring costs, but jump to   if the recipient puts in that last penny. 
(But if o is Cobb-Douglas, it is continuous at 
i A
( ) i i A s R −  = 0 since Cobb-Douglas production is 
zero when any of its inputs is.) 
  Otherwise, we assume that o and g are twice differentiable. We impose first- and second-
order assumptions: Roodman, Competitive Proliferation of Aid Projects: A Model CGD Working Paper 89  7 
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where the subscripts denote differentiation with respect to first or second arguments.
3 In words, 
output is positive in either factor alone, but with decreasing marginal returns. In the o production 
process, increasing either factor raises the marginal product of the other. As for project-level 
governance, it rises with the ratio of monitoring cost to project size, and with the recipient’s 
national-level governance, G. As either factor increases, the marginal responsiveness of project-
level governance to further monitoring falls, as would be the case if there were an asymptotic 
limit to g (“perfect governance”).
4 From these conditions arise the basic problem donors have 
apparently struggled with for decades: larger projects, including what are called programs, 
impose less overhead cost on recipients since monitoring costs rise slower than project size. But 
less monitoring can reduce the project’s “governance,” the more so in countries that are 
generally poorly governed. 
The next three sections state and analyze three problems based on this model. In the first, there is 
one donor, who chooses both how much aid to give and in how many projects, in order to 
maximize development. The section shows that sometimes there is an optimal aid volume and an 
optimal project size. The second differs in taking total aid as exogenously determined, which the 
literature demonstrates that it is a substantial extent (discussed below), leaving only project size 
as a parameter to be chosen by optimization. The third introduces multiple donors. The analysis 
                                                 
3 Strict inequalities are mostly used here to avoid extreme cases such as Leontif production that complicate analysis 
and exposition. 
4 A function that satisfies these conditions is 
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Here, as the sunk-cost ratio rises from 0, project-level governance rises asymptotically from the baseline of G to 1. 
G = 1 can be thought of as perfect national-level governance; if G = 1, then Gi ≡ 1, and monitoring has no benefit. Roodman, Competitive Proliferation of Aid Projects: A Model CGD Working Paper 89  8 
here is not exhaustive; to limit complexity, it fully investigates interiors solutions only. But it 
goes far enough to generate plausible norms for donor behavior. 
An optimal aid level? 
If donor and recipient are jointly optimizing development, what is the optimal suite of projects to 
fund? In this section, we analyze that problem taking the recipient resource budget, R, and the 
national governance level, G, as given but letting the total aid budget, A, be a free parameter for 
optimization. Available aid is unlimited. 
  In general, by symmetry, it is reasonable to assume that all projects in the optimal 
distribution are the same size. So the problem for this section can be cast as, “what is the optimal 
size and number of (identical) projects?” The question is easiest to answer when treating the 
number of projects, N, as continuous. At the optimum, the recipient’s budget constraint will bind, 
and each project will receive 
resource. recipient  in   










Total development is then, by (1), (2), and (3), 
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That this maximum could exist at all is perhaps counterintuitive, since the freedom to increase 
one input, aid, without limit should seemingly open up vast production possibilities. But a 
marginal aid increase must expand either the project count or the project size (or both), and both 
possibilities have costs. The cost of increasing the number of projects while holding their size Roodman, Competitive Proliferation of Aid Projects: A Model CGD Working Paper 89  9 
constant is that the recipient must devote more of its resources to covering monitoring costs, 
leaving less for direct production. The cost of increasing project size (while holding project 
count constant) is that monitoring efforts do not rise as fast, reducing the quality of governance 
for the projects.  
Whether a maximum exists depends in part on how low national governance is. For a 
minimally arbitrary example, set G to 0.5 (notionally middle-of-the-road), c = 0.5 (similarly), 
and R = 100. Let o take the Cobb-Douglas form,  ( ) () ( ) . ) , (
5 . 0 5 . 0 A s R A A s R A o − = −  And  give g 
the form in footnote 4, which is designed so that governance rises asymptotically toward 1 as the 
monitoring cost ratio rises:  () () ( ) ( ) i i A A s
i i e G G A A s g
− − − = 1 1 , . Here, software can confirm, D 
can indeed be increased without limit by expanding A and bringing N arbitrarily close to zero. In 
this case, the donor would fund a small fraction of a very large project; it would mandate 
essentially no recipient monitoring and effort, but would get positive output thanks the ambient 
quality of governance. However, if G goes lower, to 0.1, optimization software reports that 
development hits a maximum when A = 50.92 and N = 49.03, so that each project receives 1.038 
units of aid and 2.039 units of recipient resource; exactly half of the latter (1.019) goes to sunk 
costs. Low-enough governance constrains aid absorption. 
We use star superscripts to signify the values of variables at the solution to (7). Of 
particular interest is how when they exist, vary with the parameters R and G. As the 
numerical example suggests, and as Appendix 1 demonstrates, increasing national-level 
governance always increases the optimal project size and the optimal amount of aid—the 
recipient is more “aidworthy.” Similarly, a rise in the recipient resource budget also expands the 
recipient’s ability to absorb aid. In fact, it does so in direct proportion, so that the optimal project 
,   and  
* * N ARoodman, Competitive Proliferation of Aid Projects: A Model CGD Working Paper 89  10 
size remains unchanged. That is,   where the notation  indicates the total 










In other words, expanding the recipient’s resource budget simply multiplies the number 
of projects implemented, each with the same donor and recipient resources as before. So total 







* with respect to R is the same as the partial elasticity (analogous to the partial 
derivative) of D with respect to R:   This has an interesting consequence if o is Cobb-
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This last fraction is the portion of the recipient’s resource not consumed by monitoring costs. In 
the numerical example, , 5 . 0 = β which is why there, sunk costs consume exactly half the 
recipient’s resources. 
Fixed aid budget: single-donor case 
The previous section endogenized aid. This led to the sensible predictions that bigger, better-
governed countries get more aid, but the assumption that aid is purely endogenous is unrealistic 
since aid has been demonstrated to have a substantial exogenous component. The well-known 
small-country bias, for example, sends more aid per person or unit of GDP to smaller countries Roodman, Competitive Proliferation of Aid Projects: A Model CGD Working Paper 89  11 
(Mosley 1981; Alessina and Dollar 1998; Collier and Dollar 2002). Countries’ endowments of 
oil and other natural resources and their perceived importance in such overarching security 
strategies as the Cold War and the “Global War on Terror,” also figure prominently (Kaplan 
1975; McKinley and Little 1979; Schraeder, Hook, Taylor 1998; Moss, Roodman, and Standley 
2005). The next two sections therefore take total aid, A, as given. This simplifies the 
mathematics by turning a two-dimensional optimization problem into a one-dimensional one. 
And it leads to somewhat different predictions.  
The problem is now: 




N   (8)
A complete analysis requires examining boundary solutions. But since the purpose of this 
exercise is to motivate plausible and testable hypotheses, the details of such an analysis are 
omitted. Briefly, there are two extrema one could consider. One is the N → 0 limit. Since N is a 
continuous variable, one must imagine that as N → 0, a mere fraction of a very large project is 
being implemented. If economies of scale are great enough (if d is high enough), and national-
level governance is above zero, so that project-level governance stays above zero even in the 
absence of monitoring, this “budget support extreme” can in fact be optimal. 
The other extreme is the point, call it   at which sunk costs consume the recipient’s 
entire resource budget. At this “project oversight extreme,” the recipient devotes itself solely to 
supplying monitoring information to the donor and puts no resources into project 
implementation—no domestic covering of recurring costs, no domestic project implementation 
staff, etc. This extreme is most likely to be optimal if d is small, meaning that strong 
diseconomies of scale favor small projects (with higher monitoring demands); if c, the elasticity 
of sunk cost with respect to project size, is small, so that sunk costs do not rise too fast as 
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projects shrink; if o2 is small at that is, if the opportunity cost of recipient resources for direct 
production is low; if which embodies the marginal governance benefit of monitoring, is high 





Mathematically,   is defined by  , ˆ N ( ) A s R = , i.e., ( ) , ˆ ˆ
c





R A N − −
−
=   (9)

















⎛ = =   (10)
If the project oversight extreme is an optimum in some region of parameter space, what does 
(10) say about the dependence of the optimal project size on the parameters? At the margin, 
average project size should rise with total aid, fall with recipient resource endowment—with 
equal and opposite elasticity—and not depend on national governance level. However, a non-
marginal increase in national-level governance could dislodge the optimum from the project 
oversight extreme. It would increase project-level governance, reduce the marginal benefit of 
monitoring, and could make a project count lower than  and a project size greater 
than
, ˆ N
, ˆ A optimal. 
Another complexity is that if the optimal aid level is finite and the donor exceeds it, then a 
development-maximizing recipient will withhold its resources from some projects, forcing them 
to shut down for lack of monitoring, and devote its resources to a subset that collectively receive 
the optimal aid amount.
5 In this case, the optimum will depend at the margin on the parameters G 
and R as described in the previous section, but not on A. Gross downward changes in A, 
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however, all else equal, could break the system out of this mode, shifting the optimum to an 
interior solution. 


















In general, it is impossible to solve the first-order condition analytically for the optimum, N
*. But 
as in the previous section, we can investigate the behavior of N
* with respect to marginal changes 
in the parameters, which we do in Appendix 2. The findings are three: 
Better national-level governance favors fewer projects, thus, holding total aid constant, 
larger projects. Higher national-level governance reduces the scope for improving project-level 
governance through project oversight. Since the marginal benefit of project oversight is lower, 
the optimum shifts in favor of fewer, larger projects, for which the recipient is required to devote 
relatively less effort to oversight activities. 
The larger the recipient’s budget, the higher the optimal project count, and the smaller 
the optimal project size, all else equal. It may seem counterintuitive that recipients with larger 
budgets should have smaller projects. But countries with more government resources have fewer 
administrative bottlenecks and can absorb smaller, more numerous projects with all the attendant 
meetings and reports. The precise economic story is a bit tricky and runs as follows. If R 
increases, the amount of recipient resource directly used in production in each project, rather 
than monitoring, increases. Because there are diminishing returns to this resource in production, 
the marginal opportunity cost of instead consuming the resource in monitoring then goes down. 
Because the marginal cost of monitoring has gone down, when donor and recipient then re-solve 
the optimization problem, they will shift slightly toward smaller projects with relatively higher Roodman, Competitive Proliferation of Aid Projects: A Model CGD Working Paper 89  14 
monitoring costs. There is an other effect in the opposite direction, but it is smaller: increasing R 
raises the marginal productivity of the complementary resource in o production, namely aid, 
which in itself favors a tilt toward more aid per project and fewer projects. 
If aid to a country rises, the optimal project count grows more slowly or even shrinks, so 
the optimal project size increases. The microeconomic story here is that increasing A affects 
, N D ∂ ∂ the marginal development gain from moving to more numerous, smaller projects, in 
three ways. First, the shift to larger projects reduces the monitoring cost ratio. Since there are 
diminishing returns to monitoring in terms of project-level governance, curtailing monitoring 
increases the marginal benefit of a shift (back) to smaller, more-monitored projects. So to this 
extent, a higher A raises the marginal benefit of shifting to more, smaller projects. Second, 
because of diminishing returns in the o production process, increasing aid per project reduces the 
marginal product of that aid. That reduces the opportunity cost of bringing aid per project back 
down by splitting the aid budget into smaller, more numerous projects. So here too more aid 
favors more projects. On the other hand, and third, increasing aid per project improves the 
marginal productivity of the recipient’s complementary resource in o production, which raises 
the opportunity cost of consuming it with monitoring. This reduces the gain from moving to 
more, smaller projects, which involve more monitoring. Whether the positive or negative effects 
dominate depends on the details of the production technology and the parameters. But the 
balance of the effects is such that N
* will never grow as fast as A. As result the optimal project 
size always increases with aid. 
In sum, if donor and recipient jointly maximize development, and if A is exogenously 
determined and does not exceed the optimal aid level (if it exists), donors should fund larger 
projects or programs in countries that are better governed, out of trust); in countries with limited Roodman, Competitive Proliferation of Aid Projects: A Model CGD Working Paper 89  15 
government budgets, to avoid overload; or in countries with large aid flows, for the same reason. 
The possibility of a budget support optimum where governance is high enough is consistent with 
this message. The positive relationship between governance and project size echoes a result from 
the endogenous-aid set-up in the previous section. The negative relationship with the recipient 
budget, however, is new. One potentially counterintuitive result is that, assuming the recipient’s 
budget is proportional to gross domestic product, all else equal, larger countries should have 
smaller projects.  
Fixed aid budgets: multiple-donor case 
The purpose here, in the spirit of Knack and Rahman (2004), is to show that if there are multiple 
donors, and they each care most about the success of their own projects, then a negative 
externality will arise through competition for scarce recipient resources. This creates an incentive 
for “competitive proliferation” and leaves the recipient worse off. Partial analysis will also 
suggest that smaller donors generate a proportionally larger externality and so tend to proliferate 
more, meaning that they fund smaller projects. After describing the multi-donor framework in 
general terms, we specialize to the case of two partially selfish donors. The recipient is still 
assumed to maximize development in the allocation of its own resource. 
In the new framework, there are J donors, indexed by j. Each has an aid budget, Aj, that is still 
exogenous. Again by symmetry, all of the projects of a given donor are assumed to have the 
same size, so that project distributions can be characterized by project counts, Nj. Adapting the 
set-up from the single-donor case, 
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There are now J + 1 actors, counting the recipient. The recipient’s problem is: Roodman, Competitive Proliferation of Aid Projects: A Model CGD Working Paper 89  16 
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Let 0 ≤ αj ≤ 1 be a donor-specific “altruism” parameter as in Knack and Rahman (2004) that 
determines how much weight donor j gives to the success of other donors’ projects relative to its 





k j j D D α  
The situation, then, can be viewed as a game. The recipient’s strategy has to do with its budget 
allocation across different donors’ projects. Each donor’s strategy is the choice of one variable, 
Nj: its sole decision is how finely to divide its aid budget into projects. 
It is important to appreciate the essential difference between this set-up and classic model 
of competing private actors, in which competition can only do good. It is that there is no market 
for the recipient’s resources. The donors do not pay for the resources the way private firms pay 
for their inputs. As result, even though the optimizing recipient does allocate its resources so as 
to equate marginal products across donors the way market competition would, if a donor 
succeeds in attracting recipient resources away from another donor, it experiences the benefit but 
not the cost. We will explore how this externality can lead to inefficiency.  
If the situation is treated as a game with J + 1 players, including the recipient, then the 
development optimum described in the previous section translates into a multiplayer optimum 
that is a Nash equilibrium. This optimum consists of a total of N identical projects, with  j A and 
j R  the same for all donors. This point, which we will call the “development optimum” since it 
does maximize total development, is clearly an optimum from the point of view of the 
development-maximizing recipient. And at this point, each donor’s problem, holding constant Roodman, Competitive Proliferation of Aid Projects: A Model CGD Working Paper 89  17 
the choices of the other donors and, importantly, the recipient, is a microcosm of the global 
optimization problem in the previous section, because all donors’ projects are the same universal 
size and have the same recipient resource input per project. If a single donor can increase 
development from its projects by subdividing them more or less finely (holding the recipient’s 
resource allocation across donors fixed), then all donors can do so, and the development 
optimum is not an optimum after all. Since no player can unilaterally improve its objective 
function, the development optimum is indeed a Nash equilibrium. 
The game becomes more interesting if each donor is assumed to anticipate the recipient’s 
response to the donor’s choice of Nj. The recipient then disappears as a player, taking on a role 
analogous to that of the consumer in analysis of oligopoly, the vehicle of interaction among the 
producers. Then, a donor’s choices can attract recipient resources away from other donors. 
The remainder of this section partially analyzes that game. For simplicity, it focuses 
again on classic interior solutions. Let the vector ( )
*
j R  be the recipient’s solution to (13), and 
( )
*
j D  be total development from each donor’s set of projects at this solution. Donor j’s problem 
is: 
() (). , , given
max
* *
j k k k
j k







For simplicity now, we will assume there are just two donors. 
Broadly speaking, each donor can pursue one of two strategies. It can cooperate, 
selflessly sizing its projects in accordance with the development optimum. Or it can compete, as 
Appendix 3 spells out, adjusting its project count to attract the recipient’s resources away from 
the other donor’s projects, thereby raising development from its own projects while reducing 
total development (since it moves away from the development optimum). There are thus three Roodman, Competitive Proliferation of Aid Projects: A Model CGD Working Paper 89  18 
kinds of possible outcomes in the two-donor game: the donors cooperate; one “cooperates” while 
the other competes; and both compete. Appendix 3 shows that for a donor to lure the recipient’s 
resources away from the other donor, the direction in which it must adjust its project count is 
upward. It must proliferate, subdividing its aid budget more finely than is optimal for the 
recipient overall. If the donor is sufficiently selfish, it will gain from such a unilateral move. Of 
course, the other donor may respond in kind. 
Immediately, then, we can fill in three of the four boxes in the matrix for this game. If 
both donors cooperate, all projects will be the same size, and the development optimum will be 
achieved. But unless donors are perfectly altruistic, this outcome is not stable. If one donor 
cooperates while the other instead competes, the competing one will gain at the expense of the 
cooperating one, and at the expense of the recipient. This too tends to be unstable, since if the 
cooperating donor is actually selfish enough, it too can gain by unilaterally switching to the 
compete strategy. 
Less clear is exactly what happens if both donors choose the compete strategy. In general, 








































(maximization of recipient’s utility) 
R R R = + 2 1 (recipient budget constraint), 
along with appropriate second-order conditions. Two important questions arise about such an 
equilibrium: Which donors tend to proliferate most, small ones or large ones? And might one 
donor do better if both compete than if both cooperate? If some donors actually gain from Roodman, Competitive Proliferation of Aid Projects: A Model CGD Working Paper 89  19 
universal competitive proliferation, then it will be harder for donors to agree as a group not to 
compete—to coordinate. Full answers to these questions are elusive because of the generality of 
the specification of o and g and the complexity of the above system of equations. Moreover, by 
(32) and (33) in Appendix 3, the total derivatives in the first two equations are functions of 
second partial derivatives of D, so the derivative of solutions to the system with respect to the 
parameters involve third derivates. Understanding the effect of non-marginal changes in 
parameters is even harder. 
Here we will offer two pieces of an analysis that give some insight, one theoretical, one 
computational. At the theoretical level, Appendix 3 demonstrates that right at the development 
optimum, large, perfectly selfish donors feel less incentive to proliferate—to depart from that 
optimum—than small, perfectly selfish ones, in the sense that  the elasticity of development 
from their projects to the project count, factoring in recipient response, is lower for big donors. 
The result is intuitive. As Knack and Rahman (2004) suggest, larger donors have relatively less 
incentive to lure recipient resources away from other donors. They internalize more of the 
externality of proliferation. But this conclusion technically only holds right at the development 
optimum, so it does not describe how much donors will actually proliferate before they reach a 







For more insight, we turn to simulations. We adapt the numerical example from section 
0, so that R = 100, G = 0.1,  ( ) () ( ) ( ) , ,
5 . 0 5 . 0 A s R A A s R A o − = −   ( ) ( ) ,
5 . 0
i i A A s =  
and () () () . 1 ,
i i A A s
i i e G A A s g
− − = This time, we assume there are two donors, that they are equally 
altruistic() , 2 1 α α =  and that both donors choose to compete. In the first simulation, Donor 1 
deploys 20 units of aid while donor 2 deploys 1. Figure 1 shows how key variables evolve as Roodman, Competitive Proliferation of Aid Projects: A Model CGD Working Paper 89  20 
altruism declines from 1 to 0. At the left side, where  , 1 2 1 = =α α the donors jointly achieve the 
development optimum. Their projects are identical( ) 2 1 2 1 , R R A A = = , differing only in number, 
and as a result R1 and R2, N1 and N2, are in the same 20:1 ratio as A1 and A2—they are the same 
distance apart on the log scale. As altruism declines, however, the small donor’s project count 
(N2) escalates rapidly, while the large donor’s projects multiply more slowly, confirming smaller 
donors’ tendency to proliferate more. At the right extreme, where altruism evaporates, the small 
donor’s project count has climbed from 3.3 to 256, while the large one’s has gone from 66 to 82. 
The larger donor experiences a steady deterioration in the output of development from its 
projects, from 29.3 to 25.2. The small donor actually gains as altruism falls—at the margin until 
altruism goes below 0.8, and overall through to the very end. Output from its projects starts at 
1.47, rises to 1.88, then slides to 1.62, as the war of proliferation takes a toll at the margin even 
on the small donor. The recipient shifts from putting 4.8% of its resources into the small donor’s 
projects to 18.6% even though the small donor has not increased its aid giving. Total 
development from all projects falls from 30.8 to 26.8. In sum, the smaller donor benefits from 
competitive proliferation, but at the expense of a massive increase in project count, a diversion of 
recipient resources, and a 13% decline in development. 
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Figure 1. Dependence of key variables on altruism in Nash equilibria, Cobb-Douglas 





































































Adjusting the parameters does not change the story radically, but the incremental changes 
are interesting. As A1 rises toward A2, there comes a point where even the small donor loses 
under unbridled competitive proliferation. This must be so, for if A1 = A2, by symmetry, the two 
donors will share equally in the (diminished) development pie. 
Meanwhile, increasing the elasticity of substitution between aid and the recipient 
resource (via a symmetric, constant-returns-to-scale CES production function for o) inhibits 
proliferation—but increases the aggregate cost for development of what proliferation does occur. 
Why? What restrains the donors from proliferating ad infinitum is the cost of doing so for their Roodman, Competitive Proliferation of Aid Projects: A Model CGD Working Paper 89  22 
own projects, namely the diversion of the recipient resource from productive use in the o 
production process to the increased monitoring of smaller projects. And if the elasticity of 
substitution between aid and the recipient resource is high, then the limited availability of aid to 
a (very small) project is less of a constraint on the marginal productivity of the recipient’s 
resource in direct production. The marginal productivity of the recipient’s resource being higher, 
so is the opportunity cost of consuming it with monitoring. This puts a firmer limit on the extent 
of proliferation, but also leads to greater costs overall in the equilibrium. Figure 2 shows how the 
simulation changes when the elasticity of substitution switches from 1, the Cobb-Douglas case, 
to 2. The small donor’s projects multiply by a factor of 66 instead of 77, but total development 
falls 15% instead of 13%. Roodman, Competitive Proliferation of Aid Projects: A Model CGD Working Paper 89  23 
Figure 2. Dependence of key variables on altruism in Nash equilibria, CES production, 





































































In sum, in the two-donor case, unless donors are perfectly altruistic, those with less 
market share proliferate more. Meanwhile, the results from the one-donor model in the previous 
section carry over with some modification. Simulations not reported here confirm that a change 
in the recipient’s national-level governance quality (G) or resource budget (R) affect the 
marginal trade-offs in the donors’ decisions the same way as before, so that better governance or 
a tighter resource budget still leads to larger projects all around. 
The dependence of equilibrium project sizes on total aid (A), however, is trickier. If 
donor 1, say, expands its aid spending, A1, thus increasing A, the effect documented in this Roodman, Competitive Proliferation of Aid Projects: A Model CGD Working Paper 89  24 
section, a greater reluctance of larger donors to proliferate, compounds the effect documented in 
the section before, whereby more aid leads to larger projects in order to avoid overburdening the 
recipient. The dependence of the equilibrium project size,  , 1 A on the other donor’s aid, however, 
is more complex. If increases while stays constant, the two effects just cited relating aid 
quantity and project size will sometimes counteract and sometimes reinforce each other. This is 
because if  is much larger than , further growth of gives the other donor an even more 
dominant role in the recipient country. And since large donors are in effect more high-minded, 
even greater dominance can reduce the tendency of the entire system toward competitive 
proliferation. At the other extreme, if is vanishingly small, to the point where the presence of 
the donor 2 has little effect on the sizing of donor 1's projects, then an increase in can make donor 2 
into more of a competitive presence, pushing donor 1 in the direction of proliferation. 
2 A 1 A
2 A 1 A 2 A
2 A
2 A
For higher numbers of donors, the situation becomes more challenging to analyze, 
whether with calculus or simulations. But the implications from the two-donor example seem 
clear. A given donor’s average project size is positively related to its aid budget and the 
country’s governance and negatively related to the recipient’s resource budget. Its relationship to 
total aid of the other donors is more complex, and depends on the degree of fractionalization of 
the other donors as a group. For example, if donor j accounts for 5% of the aid to a country, its 
projects should be much bigger if the other 95% is accounted for by a single donor than if it is 
divided evenly among 100 small ones. In the latter case, there should be much more competitive 
proliferation, assuming donors are not perfectly altruistic, driving project sizes downward. 
Empirically,  should interact with measures of fractionalization to influence i A A− . i A  Roodman, Competitive Proliferation of Aid Projects: A Model CGD Working Paper 89  25 
Conclusions 
One core idea of the model developed here is that the administrative burden for the recipient 
associated with aid projects has both costs and benefits. Oversight can improve recipient 
administration of aid projects, but at the expense of diverting limited recipient resources from 
more directly productive use. The other key assumption is that larger projects involve 
proportionally less oversight burden. The conclusions that flow from the model are that projects 
should be larger in recipients where aid is higher in absolute terms; where recipient resources, 
which might be proportional to absolute GDP or tax revenue, are scarcer; and where national-
level governance is better. 
The other core idea is that while donors can compete for recipient resources, they do not 
do so through a market. As a result, assuming donors are not perfectly altruistic, there is a 
tendency in the aid system toward competitive proliferation, which reduces overall development. 
Coordination among donors could solve this problem, but small donors may be least interested in 
coordinating since they can gain from proliferation. Bringing them into a coordination regime 
will require what economists would call pay-offs, but which could in fact take many forms, from 
quiet pressure to sharing of office space. Alternatively, donors and recipients construct markets 
in recipient resources, perhaps through auctions. But it is hard to see how to make this practical. 
Whether the assertions above about where projects “should” be bigger is best read in a 
normative or descriptive sense is less clear. If the assumptions about the costs and benefits of 
oversight activities are realistic, then the modeling results about optimal project size can be read 
as a guide for increasing aid effectiveness. If one makes the even stronger assumptions that 
donors understand these dynamics and that development results, at least from their own projects, 
dominate their objective functions, then the results can be read as predictions about donor 
behavior. Testing those predictions is separate project.Roodman, Competitive Proliferation of Aid Projects: A Model  26 
One interesting and substantial extension to the model would be to make it dynamic, by 
endogenizing governance and/or recipient resources. Both could depend monotonically on 
development, itself the outcome of the production processes modeled here. Or donors could 
increase recipient resources directly, through capacity-building aid. Roodman, Competitive Proliferation of Aid Projects: A Model  27 
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Appendix 1.  Comparative statics with endogenous aid and one donor 
This section demonstrates that if aid is a free parameter for optimization, along with the project 
count, and there is a single donor who jointly maximizes development with the recipient, then a) 
the optimal aid level,   and optimal project count,  if they exist, are directly proportional 
to the recipient’s resource budget, R, thus that the optimal project size is invariant with respect to 
R; and b) the optimal aid level and project size are positively related to the recipient’s 




A few identities are helpful for a formal demonstration. If we take G as fixed for the 
moment, then o is homogeneous of degree 0 in R, A, and N, as is g in A and N. This is because o 
then depends only on  R A   and   while g depends only on  . A  (Equations (2) define o and g.) It 
follows that  is homogeneous of degree 1 in these three parameters. According to 
Euler’s Theorem,  
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(15) 
 
where ε  means partial elasticity. One implication is that if R, A, and N, all expand by the same 
percentage, meaning that inputs per project hold constant while the project count grows, then so 
does D. Unsurprisingly, doubling the number of identical projects doubles development. 
Similarly, if P represents one of the parameters R, A, or N, then  P D ∂ ∂  is homogeneous of 
degree 0. Applying Euler’s Theorem to P D ∂ ∂  yields 
. 0    and    0
2 2 2
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As a final identity, note that the second partial derivatives of D with respect to R, A, and N are 
homogeneous of degree –1. Roodman, Competitive Proliferation of Aid Projects: A Model  29 
To formally examine how the optimal aid level and project size depend on the recipient resource 















and the Hessian of D with respect to A and N is negative semi-definite. We want to prove that if 
A
* and N
* are optimal at R, then kA
* and kN
* are optimal at kR, k any positive number. That is, 
expanding the recipient’s resource budget leads, in the optimum, to a proportional multiplication 
in the number of projects, thus no change in their size. 
Since  A D ∂ ∂ and  N D ∂ ∂  are homogeneous of degree 0 in R, A, N, they remain 
unchanged (still 0) when all three parameters are scaled by k. Meanwhile, the second derivatives 
in the Hessian, homogeneous of degree –1, are all multiplied by k
-1, so that the Hessian at the 
new point is still negative semi-definite. Thus (kA
*, kN
*) also satisfies the first- and second-order 
conditions when the resource budget is kR, and is a local maximum, as desired. 
Analyzing the effects on the optimum of changing recipient governance, G, is more 
involved. We begin with total differentials of equations (17) with respect to G and the free 


























































































































Labeling the Hessian matrix on the left H, and assuming without much loss in generality that it 












































































Multiplying the top element of each column vector by 
* A G and the bottom by  ,
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Since  A D ∂ ∂  and  N D ∂ ∂  are zero at the optimum, some of the elasticities above are zero or 
infinite there, which necessitates the limit operator. If the elasticities on the right-hand side were 
re-expressed in derivatives,  A D ∂ ∂  and  N D ∂ ∂  factors would arise and cancel out, eliminating 
the apparent singularity. 
The next step is to return to the definition of D in terms of o and g and their parameters in 
order to delve into the elasticities in (19). Now, Roodman, Competitive Proliferation of Aid Projects: A Model  31 
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∂ ∂   (21)
Because g2, like g, depends only on  , A not A and N separately, it too is homogeneous of degree 0 
with respect to A and N. Thus   whence the quantities in (20) and (21) 
are equal and opposite. Substituting into (19), 
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 (by (15)). 
 (22) 
To demonstrate that the optimal aid level and project size rise with G, i.e., that  and 
(these elements constitute the left-hand side) we need to show that all the terms outside 
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0 > H  because H is negative definite with even dimension (its two eigenvalues are negative 






A ε ε ε − = in general, if A increases, then the first 
argument of g, the ratio of monitoring cost to project size, decreases, and so does g. Thus Roodman, Competitive Proliferation of Aid Projects: A Model  32 
. 0 <
g






2 ε is positive. Thus all the outside terms on the right 
side of (22) are positive, as needed. 
It remains to analyze 
R D
N
∂ ∂ ε and  ,
R D
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solution, a maximum of D with respect R. This confirms that the bottom term of the right-hand-
side vectors is less than the top term. We study 
R D
N
∂ ∂ ε much the way we did  ,
G D
A
∂ ∂ ε  in (20): 
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Since o is homogeneous of degree d in its two arguments A (a n d ),
c A R −  o2 is homogeneous of 
degree d – 1, and o2/o, treated as a single function, is homogeneous of degree –1: its elasticities 
with respect to its arguments sum to –1. Using the chain rule for elasticities,  
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The last step here uses 1 − =
A








− ε which can be derived using the sum rule 











ε  Substituting into (23),  
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By (4),  and   Moreover, c < 1 and, by at an interior solution, the excess of the  0 2 ≥
o ε . 0
2
2 ≤
o εRoodman, Competitive Proliferation of Aid Projects: A Model  33 
recipient’s resource input over monitoring cost,  ,
c A R − is positive. As a result,
R D
N
∂ ∂ ε is positive, 
as claimed. Better-governed countries should get bigger projects as well as more aid.Roodman, Competitive Proliferation of Aid Projects: A Model  34 
Appendix 2.  Comparative statics with exogenous aid and one donor 
This section demonstrates that if the donor’s aid budget is given and donor and recipient jointly 
maximize development, then projects will be larger where there is more aid, where the 
recipient’s resource budget is tighter in absolute terms, and larger where the recipient’s 
governance is better—all else equal. 
For each parameter of interest, P (meaning A, R, or G), the first-order condition 
0 = ∂ ∂ N D defines an isoquant in P-N space because for each value of P there is an optimal 
project count, N, called N














































  (27) 
 











































ε   (29)












factors cancel out. But since they are present and zero at N = N
*, the fractions are technically 
indeterminate there, which necessitates the limit operators. By (12), the denominator of the grand 
fraction in all three versions is negative. For two parameters of interest—P = G or R—both P 
and P D ∂ ∂ are positive everywhere. So for these two, (28) shows that the task of determining the 
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first, then move to the third parameter, A.  





2 ε ε =
∂ ∂ (equation (21)), and that this is negative 
at an optimum with respect to N. According to (28), so is  better national-level governance 




As for the dependence of optimal project count on the recipient resource budget, R, 
Appendix 1 also demonstrates that 
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and that this is positive, which by (28) means is too. In words, the larger the recipient’s 




To determine,   the dependence of the optimum project count on the final parameter, A, we 
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We have seen that 0 <
∂ ∂ N D
N ε  and 0 >
∂ ∂ N D
R ε  at N
*, thus near it. Ergo  More aid makes 





A εAppendix 3.  Comparative statics with exogenous aid and two donors 
This appendix derives two results used in section 0 for the two-donor case: that at the 
development optimum, each donor, unless perfectly altruistic about the success of the 
other’s projects, has an incentive to proliferate, increasing its project count in order to 
lure recipient resources away from the other donor’s projects in a way that is detrimental 
to overall development; and that the temptation is greatest, in a certain sense, for small 
donors. 
We start with the problems defined in (13) and (14), with two donors. Taking the 
donors choices as given for the moment and focusing on the recipient’s problem, a 
Lagrangian argument shows, as usual, that the recipient’s solution exhausts its budget and 



















Now, to describe how the recipient responds to a change in a donor’s behavior, we 
















































(using the chain rule in the second equation). Substituting the first equation into the 
second and rearranging gives a formula for how the recipient reallocates its resource in 
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Since D2 can be viewed as a function of R1 via the constraint R2 = R –R1, we can write 
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The denominator of the final expression is the second derivative of total development 
with respect to the recipient’s choice of R1; it is negative since at the development 
optimum we are analyzing, the recipient achieves a maximum of D with respect to R1.
 
The numerator is positive by arguments identical to those used in the Appendix 1 to show 
that  0 >
∂ ∂ R D
N ε (23), meaning that dividing the aid budget more finely increases the 
marginal product of the recipient’s resource. The overall result is that  1
*
1 dN dR  is 
positive. So when a donor raises its project count while holding total aid constant, it 
attracts the recipient’s resource away from the other donor. 
A corollary is that the development optimum is not a Nash equilibrium if donors factor 
the recipient’s behavior into their choices, unless the donors are perfectly altruistic. To 
see this, note that the marginal effect on output from donor 1’s projects if it proliferates 
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The effect on donor 1’s utility is 


























































α α    
Since  0 1 2 = ∂ ∂ N D (D2 does not depend on N1), since the recipient resource constraint 




2 dN dR dN dR − = and since the recipient’s optimizing behavior assures that 
































= + α α   (34)
At the development optimum, the first term on the right, the direct impact on donor 1’s 
projects of proliferations, is zero. The second term, the benefit of attracting more 
recipient resources, is positive by (5) and (31) unless donor 1 is perfectly altruistic 
(α1 = 1). So increasing the project count while holding aid constant serves the imperfectly 
altruistic donor. But of course it moves the recipient away from the development 
optimum, for a net loss in total development. 
In fact, by the Envelope Theorem, since the recipient chooses R1 to maximize D, 

















=   (35)
Right at the development optimum, this is zero. But as donor 1 moves away from the 
optimum, in the direction of larger projects, 1 1 N D ∂ ∂ goes negative since D is concave 
there with respect to N1. Beneath the surface of this equation, the indirect effect on total 
development of increasing N1, via the recipient’s resource shift, is zero because the 
recipient is continuously operating at a margin where the development benefit of its 
resources is equated across donors. As a result, the direct (and negative) effect on total 
development of donor 1’s proliferation constitutes the overall impact on development. 
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The essential point here is that at and near the development optimum Donor 1 
experiences little harm from proliferating, for this is the region where the derivative of D1 
with respect to N1 vanishes. Yet increasing its project count does bring a gain by 
attracting recipient resources away from other donors. And because there is no 
competitive market in these resources, Donor 1 does not pay for them. An externality 
results. 
  The temptation to proliferation at the development optimum is greatest for smaller 
donors. This is most easily demonstrated for perfectly selfish donors. In this case, using 


































































































at the development optimum). 
This is the marginal relationship of a selfish donor’s utility to its project count. Notice 
that the denominator is the same for both donors. Meanwhile, the other terms on the right 

















































  (using elasticity identities) 
(using (23)) 
 
At the development optimum, the donors’ projects are identical and differ only in 
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number. The terms   and are therefore the same for both donors. Only the 1 / N g o ⋅ 2
g o
N j
⋅ 2 ε j 














N =   (36)
At the development optimum, all projects are identical, so we can write  
Multiplying both sides of (36) by 
. g o N D j j ⋅ ⋅ =
2 2 1 1 N D N D g o = = ⋅ leads to  At the 
development optimum, the elasticity of a donor’s utility with respect to its project count 
is inversely related to that project count, which is itself directly proportional to donor’s 
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